xref: /plugin/hideip/README.md (revision 047cf1274130bf2cc2a8d4fd101f0662c03da350)
1e6a02230Stracker-user# Hide IP plugin for DokuWiki
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3e6a02230Stracker-userRemoves IP addresses from everywhere a DokuWiki admin might see them. Two parts that work together:
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5e6a02230Stracker-user- **Real-time anonymisation** — an action plugin that rewrites `$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']` to `0.0.0.0` and clears every common forwarding header before any DokuWiki code reads them. From the moment the plugin is enabled, every new changelog entry, page metadata write, mailer header, and `$INFO['client']` value carries `0.0.0.0` instead of the real address.
6e6a02230Stracker-user- **Historical scrub** — an admin page that walks the IP-bearing files DokuWiki already has on disk (changelogs and page metadata) and rewrites them. Authorship (user field) and modification timestamps are preserved; only the IP field changes.
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8e6a02230Stracker-userTested on DokuWiki `2025-05-14b "Librarian"`.
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10e6a02230Stracker-user## Why not the existing plugins?
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12e6a02230Stracker-userThere are three related plugins on dokuwiki.org. None of them quite fit this use case.
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142a25b111Stracker-user**`anonip`** (Andreas Gohr, 2016, [dokuwiki.org/plugin:anonip](https://www.dokuwiki.org/plugin:anonip)) was the canonical answer. It generates a pseudo-IPv6 from `auth_browseruid()`. The problem, [as discussed on the DokuWiki forum](https://forum.dokuwiki.org/d/18284-dont-store-ip-addresses), is that `auth_browseruid()` mixes in the first IPv4 octet of the client address, which makes the hash brute-forceable: an attacker iterating through ~256 octet values and a list of common User-Agent strings can recover the user's first IP octet and User-Agent. A community [fork by adakaleh](https://github.com/adakaleh/dokuwiki-plugin-anonip/tree/replace_auth_browseruid) swaps in `session_id()` instead — better, but adds session-stability assumptions and still produces a pseudo-IP for an admin to see when usernames already differentiate edits.
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16e6a02230Stracker-user**`gdpr`** (Michael Große, 2019, [dokuwiki.org/plugin:gdpr](https://www.dokuwiki.org/plugin:gdpr)) takes a different approach: it lets real IPs be recorded as users edit, then strips them from changelog entries older than `$conf['recent_days']` (default 90 days). This works for GDPR retention but doesn't fit a "no IPs anywhere, ever" policy, and it leaves IPs visible in the Recent Changes view for up to three months. It also touches only changelog files and skips the master changelog (`_dokuwiki.changes`) entirely, leaving IPs visible in Recent Changes after old per-page entries are cleaned.
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18e6a02230Stracker-user**This plugin** combines what works from both: anonip's real-time interception (simplified to a constant `0.0.0.0` since the wiki has named users) plus a one-shot historical scrub that does cover the master changelogs and page metadata.
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20e6a02230Stracker-user## What gets anonymised
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22e6a02230Stracker-user### In real time (action component)
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24e6a02230Stracker-user`$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']` becomes `0.0.0.0`. These forwarding headers are removed: `HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR`, `HTTP_X_REAL_IP`, `HTTP_CLIENT_IP`, `HTTP_FORWARDED`, `HTTP_CF_CONNECTING_IP`, `HTTP_TRUE_CLIENT_IP`. The User-Agent is left alone (it's not an IP).
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26e6a02230Stracker-userThe hook fires on `INIT_LANG_LOAD`, after DokuWiki's `init.php` has applied any trusted-proxy `X-Forwarded-For` rewriting, but before any other code reads the IP. Every downstream consumer — `clientIP()`, `$INPUT->server->str('REMOTE_ADDR')`, changelog writers, metadata, mailer `X-Originating-IP`, AJAX page-info — sees the placeholder.
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28e6a02230Stracker-user### On disk (admin component, on demand)
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30e6a02230Stracker-user| File pattern | What it is | What changes |
31e6a02230Stracker-user| --- | --- | --- |
32e6a02230Stracker-user| `data/meta/**/*.changes` | Per-page change history; master `_dokuwiki.changes` | TSV field 2 (IP) rewritten to `0.0.0.0` |
33e6a02230Stracker-user| `data/media_meta/**/*.changes` | Per-media change history; master | Same |
34e6a02230Stracker-user| `data/meta/**/*.meta` | Page metadata (serialized) | `$meta[*]['last_change']['ip']` rewritten to `0.0.0.0` |
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36e6a02230Stracker-userTimestamps, page IDs, usernames, summaries, and size deltas are preserved verbatim. File mtimes are restored after each write.
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38e6a02230Stracker-user**Out of scope by design:**
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40e6a02230Stracker-user- `data/attic/` and `data/media_attic/` — historical gzip archives of page revisions. Admins generally don't view these; the project's filesystem owner has access to logs anyway. Rewriting them would be slow and require gzip handling for marginal benefit.
41e6a02230Stracker-user- `data/cache/`, `data/tmp/`, `data/log/`, `data/locks/` — ephemeral or regenerated.
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43e6a02230Stracker-user## Page locking still works
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45e6a02230Stracker-userFor each lock, DokuWiki writes the username if one is set, otherwise IP and session-id. From `inc/common.php`:
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47e6a02230Stracker-user```php
48e6a02230Stracker-userif ($INPUT->server->str('REMOTE_USER')) {
49e6a02230Stracker-user    io_saveFile($lock, $INPUT->server->str('REMOTE_USER'));
50e6a02230Stracker-user} else {
51e6a02230Stracker-user    io_saveFile($lock, clientIP() . "\n" . session_id());
52e6a02230Stracker-user}
53e6a02230Stracker-user```
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55e6a02230Stracker-userIf your wiki has no anonymous edits (the use case this plugin is built for), every lock uses the username and IP isn't consulted. Even if you do allow anonymous edits, `unlock()` checks `session_id()` as a fallback, so a constant `0.0.0.0` still releases your own lock correctly.
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57e6a02230Stracker-user## Install
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59e6a02230Stracker-userIn your wiki:
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61e6a02230Stracker-user1. **Admin → Extension Manager → Manual Install**
62e6a02230Stracker-user2. Upload `hideip.zip`, click **Install**
63e6a02230Stracker-user3. Real-time anonymisation is now active. To scrub existing data: refresh the Admin page and open **Hide IP** under Additional Plugins.
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65e6a02230Stracker-userOr drop the directory into `lib/plugins/hideip/` directly.
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67e6a02230Stracker-user## Run the historical scrub
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69e6a02230Stracker-user1. **Admin → Hide IP**
70e6a02230Stracker-user2. Click **Preview (count only)** to see how many files and IP slots would be rewritten.
71e6a02230Stracker-user3. Click **Scrub now** to execute. The scrub is atomic per file (tmp file + rename) and preserves mtimes. It's also idempotent — running it again is a no-op once everything is at the placeholder.
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73e6a02230Stracker-userTake a backup with the Site Backup plugin first if you want a recovery point — the scrub is intentionally destructive.
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75e6a02230Stracker-user## Security model
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77e6a02230Stracker-user- **Admin-only.** `forAdminOnly() = true`, plus an explicit `auth_isadmin()` check inside the scrub method.
78e6a02230Stracker-user- **CSRF-protected.** All actions go through `checkSecurityToken()`.
79e6a02230Stracker-user- **POST-only scrub.** The scrub action rejects GET / HEAD so a stray link or prefetch can't trigger it.
80e6a02230Stracker-user- **Atomic writes.** Every file write goes through a sibling `.hideip_tmp_<8 hex>` file and is `rename()`d into place. A concurrent reader sees either the old file or the new file, never a half-written state.
81e6a02230Stracker-user- **File mtimes preserved.** The on-disk modification time of each file is restored after the scrub, so it doesn't look like everything was just edited.
82e6a02230Stracker-user- **Idempotent.** Re-running scrub is safe — already-anonymised entries are skipped, no double-writes.
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84*047cf127Stracker-user## Trusted-proxy caveat
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86*047cf127Stracker-userThe action component replaces `$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']` at `INIT_LANG_LOAD`, which fires after DokuWiki's base-URL constants (`DOKU_URL`, `DOKU_BASE`) are already frozen into place (init.php:103-104). However, runtime calls to `is_ssl()` after init — used by some URL-building helpers — also check `REMOTE_ADDR` against `$conf['trustedproxy']` to decide whether to trust an `HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO` header. If your wiki is behind a reverse proxy that relies on this check, set `$conf['baseurl']` explicitly in `conf/local.php` so DokuWiki does not consult `REMOTE_ADDR` for URL or SSL construction.
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88e6a02230Stracker-user## Compatibility
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90e6a02230Stracker-user- DokuWiki `2025-05-14b "Librarian"` and onwards (uses the modern namespaced `dokuwiki\Extension\AdminPlugin` / `ActionPlugin` base classes).
91*047cf127Stracker-user- PHP 8.0+ (`str_ends_with()` used in the admin component).
92e6a02230Stracker-user- No external dependencies.
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94e6a02230Stracker-user## License
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96e6a02230Stracker-userGPL-2.0-or-later, matching DokuWiki itself.
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